This paper sketches the key differences in the EU and the U.S. repo markets to inform the policy recommendations for harmonization and standardization of rules governing repo contracts put forward by the international financial fora and standard setters. In so doing, it examines three main aspects of the repo markets. First, it highlights the differences in the legal framework governing repo markets, such as legal construction of repo contracts, special insolvency treatment, and legal treatment of the reuse of collateral. Second, it discusses the composition, structure and organization of the repo markets, such as differences in the composition of repo participants, maturity of repos and the composition of the underlying collateral in repo contracts. Finally, it investigates the differences in the issues related to the market infrastructure of repo markets such as differences in the clearing and collateral management stages. The main finding of this paper is that in spite of significant efforts to standardize and harmonize repo markets as well as their applicable legal framework in the past, there remains significant differences across the Atlantic. Such differences in the legal framework, composition, structure and organization of repo markets and repo markets infrastructure would require differential and more nuanced approach to regulating repo markets than what is pursued by the current international financial standard setters.
Introduction
The vulnerabilities in the wholesale funding and in particular short-term (overnight) repurchase agreement (repo) markets were a significant source of systemic risk in the Global Financial Crisis (GFC) . 1 In the aftermath of the crisis, international regulatory fora as well as supra-national and national regulators on both sides of the Atlantic were given the arduous task of reforming the legal environment of the short-term financing channels perceived to be at the heart of the crisis. Since the largest European banks obtain collateral using Securities
Financing Transactions (SFTs) (including repos) rather than using derivatives, 2 repo transactions -as the main instrument for short-term wholesale funding 3 -occupies the epicenter of the regulatory initiatives to address the fragilities in the short-term funding markets.
The excessive dependence on short-term wholesale funding contributed to the failure of some of the largest investment and commercial banks, such as Bear Stearns, Lehman Brothers, and Northern Rock. 4 In addition to maturity and liquidity transformation, repo transactions involve varying degrees of financial leverage depending on the level of haircuts or initial margins.
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The levered maturity mismatch combined with the lack of access to government safety nets, 1 Gary B. Gorton and Andrew Metrick, "Securitized Banking and the Run on Repo," Journal of Financial Economics 104, no. 3 (2012) .; Gary B. Gorton, Slapped by the Invisible Hand: The Panic of 2007 (New York: Oxford University Press, 2010) . 2 The data on collateral flows show that the at the beginning of 2013, the gross collateral flows (collateral posted and received) though repos amounted to €5.8 trillion, whereas collateral flows through derivatives stood at €340 billion. The total gross collateral flows stood at €8.5 trillion. 6. See Table 2 of Keller et al. (2014) . Quoted from ESRB to ESMA opinion on securities financing transactions, pp. catapulted repo markets, as part of the shadow banking system, into the center of the fragility of the financial system. 6 Indeed, the subprime-mortgage crisis is described as a "run on repo", which is comparable to a traditional bank run in modern securitized banking with repo as a funding source. 7 Gorton and Metrick show that during the GFC, the average haircut of structured securities peaked, which rendered some of them unacceptable as collateral (i.e., a 100% haircut) in repo markets.
Critics point out that this comparison is flawed due to its failure to include U.S. treasuries and agency bonds, which are the largest pool of collateral, or to include any evidence of run on tri-party repos, which constitute the largest part of repo markets in the U.S. 8 Therefore,
according to the critics, the impact of rising haircuts was largely overestimated. For example, Krishnamurthy, Nagel and Orlov only observed moderate increase in haircuts for structured securities and corporate bonds, ranging from 3-4% to 5-7% in 2009. 9 Although the impact of repos in financial markets might be overstated, since repos allow for leveraged maturity and liquidity transformation without access to government safety nets, they lie at the heart of the fragility of the shadow banking system. The Panic of 2007.; Gary Gorton, "Shadow Banking," The RegionDecember 2010. 8 Krishnamurthy, Nagel, and Orlov, "Sizing up Repo."; International Capital Market Association, "Frequently Asked Questions on Repo," ed. International Capital Market Association (ICMA) (2015) , 31.; 9 Krishnamurthy, Nagel, and Orlov, "Sizing up Repo," 31. In repo markets, as part of the debt markets, the market participants would rather cease to invest altogether or decline accepting certain collateral than demanding an increase in initial margin. Ibid. 10 Board, "Securities Lending and Repos: Market Overview and Financial Stability Issues-Interim Report of the Fsb Workstream on Securities Lending and Repos." P. 8 To see how government extended support to the shadow banking (especially broker dealers) and hence create new sets of government-backed shadow banking system, see Pozsar, "Shadow Banking: The Money View." This paper is the first comparative study of the repo markets in the U.S. and the EU systemically contrasting different aspects of the repo markets across the Atlantic. Such an exercise is necessary for the formulation of policy recommendations at the international level particularly when international standard setters are determined to address the vulnerabilities of the shadow banking system. This paper proceeds as follows: first it studies the differences in the legal framework governing repo transactions. Second, it focuses on the composition, structure and organization of repo markets to uncover the subtle differences in the repo terms, market participants and the underlying collateral backing repo transactions. Third, it examines the differences in the market infrastructure within which repos are being cleared and settled which can potentially have dramatic impact on financial stability. Finally, the paper discusses the impact of the Basel III leverage and liquidity requirements on repo markets. The main source of data used in this paper are the ICMA survey for the European repo markets and the website of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York for the U.S. market.
Differences in the U.S. and EU repo markets
The focus of international efforts and transatlantic regulatory reforms have been on addressing the fragility of the shadow banking (as well as banking) system by incenting financial institutions to reduce their leverage, improve their liquidity conditions, and specifically reduce their reliance on short-term wholesale funding. One of the targets of regulation therefore was repo transactions, 11 about which the Financial Stability Board (FSB) has issued several recommendations. However, a careful examination of the market structure and legal structure of the repo markets across the Atlantic reveals their fundamental differences and raises doubts 11 In the securities lending, the lender passes the legal title of securities to the borrower for the life of the loan. When securities are returned to the lender, the lender again retains the title to the loan. Even though the lender does not have legal title to the securities lent, the economic benefits of corporate actions (stock splits, income and dividends) will accrue to the lender.
However, in case of equity securities, the lender will not retain voting rights of the securities it has lent for the duration of the term of the loan.
about whether a uniform regulatory approach is a right path to take. 12 Thus, understanding the distinction in the market structure of repo markets in the EU and the one in the U.S. is of paramount importance for regulation of both markets, as well as other developing financial markets.
Differences in legal construction and applicable law
From an economic point of view, a repo is equivalent to a secured loan. The lender (buyer) in a repo receives the underlying securities as collateral while the borrower (seller) commits to buy the same asset back in the future. Under normal circumstances, the buyer will earn a return after reselling the asset back to the repo seller in the closing leg at a higher price. Thanks to its simple legal structure, repos are widely accepted across common-law as well as civil-law jurisdictions.
A typical repo transaction can be chronologically divided into multiple steps. 13 The parties should first reach an agreement as to the key terms and conditions, such as parties, maturity date, securities and cash amount, haircuts, repo interest and so on. This first step is referred to as "trading". After this agreement has been reached, the parties will each examine their remaining obligation to deliver cash in the same currency and/or the same security to each other and work out a net volume on a daily basis. They may also be bound by legal obligation to clear this transaction multilaterally. After this 'clearing' stage, the seller keeps the security on its book while adding a loan to its liabilities and the received cash as an asset. The purchased asset does not appear on the balance sheet of the buyer since the seller agrees to buy it back. At last, the parties will manage the underlying collateral.
14 In Europe, a repurchase agreement transfers legal title to collateral from the seller to the buyer.
In other words, a repo in Europe is a true sale; hence the name 'title transfer (financial) 12 See Eddy Wymeersch, "Shadow Banking and Systemic Risk," European Banking Institute Working Paper Series No. 1 (2017) . P. 19. 13 Ibid., p. 41.
14 As will be explained in this paper, one of the most significant differences between the European and the U.S. Repo market lies in this "collateral management" stage.
collateral arrangement' (TTCA). 15 This renders repo a cheap source of funding and liquidity for repo market participants. The repo seller can use the cash it has borrowed to buy the same or similar assets in the market (i.e., to finance its long positions), meanwhile, the repo buyer can reuse the collateral to refinance itself in a similar fashion during the life of the repo (i.e., to cover its short positions). 16 Theoretically, this process could repeat several times until profitability is exhausted by initial margining or credit limits.
However, in the U.S., under the New York State law, since transferring title to collateral is difficult, the collateral is pledged, but it is exempt from certain provisions of the U.S.
Bankruptcy Code that apply to pledges (automatic stay). 17 Nonetheless, the pledgee or the buyer is given a general right of use of collateral, which is also known as rehypothecation.
18
In spite of this legal nuance, this arrangement effectively -and in economic terms -is equivalent to an outright sale. Agreements," 9., see also its fn. 10.
hazard. In addition, repo transactions in the U.S. are mostly overnight and short term. Since the law recognizes repo as a QFC but not a traditional secured loan, it would incent lenders to concentrate their funds in this method of lending, rendering traditional financing methods (e.g., long terms and unsecured loans) obsolete. This would amount to a decrease in market discipline as the unsecured creditors are believed to be the watchdogs of market discipline.
37
Therefore, it is argued that this safe harbor does not reduce systemic contagion, because it overlooks some intricate complexities, interconnectedness and interactions among financial institutions. The safe harbors also are considered responsible for the failure of Lehman Brothers, especially accounting for the fact that the exemptions from the automatic stay failed to prevent a run on Lehman. 38 It is documented that just before the collapse of Lehman brothers, JP Morgan seized $17 billion in Lehman's collateral and demanded an additional $5 billion payment.
39
Scholars are also divided on a wide spectrum on this contested issue. Some believe that the safe harbors should be totally repealed. 40 Others believe that they should be maintained in their entirety. And a third group believes in narrowing down the scope of such safe harbors. In general, removing the automatic stay exemption would act as a curb on repos by reducing the liquidity of the collateral, particularly in tri-party markets. 42 This can be viewed as a sensible regulatory measure to reduce the reliance on lower-quality collateral, akin to setting minimum haircuts. However, removing this exemption would probably be unwarranted for higher-quality collateral, such as most government-guaranteed securities.
43
A rather different proposal comes from Acharya and Öncü who propose creating a special resolution authority called 'Repo Resolution Authority' (RRA) for addressing the potential systemic risks of repo collateral fire sales during a financial crisis. They advocate for removing the bankruptcy safe harbor except for high quality government bonds. In the event of a default by a counterparty on a repo, the RRA would make a liquidity payment to repo lenders and then would try to liquidate the collateral in an orderly manner. In this case, an ex-ante fee should be charged on the repo lenders and there should also be certain eligibility criteria on repo lenders.
44
In the U.S., as a response to the concerns of run on repo giving rise to disorderly resolution of banks, the exemption from automatic stay no longer entirely applies to banks being taken over In addition, section 724 requires the segregation of assets for uncleared swaps. According to this requirement, a swap dealer or a Major Swap Participant (MSP) should notify the party wishing to enter a swap transaction at the beginning of the swap transaction that it has "the right to require the segregation of the funds or other property supplied to margin, guarantee, or secure the obligations of the counterparty." The aim of this provision is to prevent the swap dealers or an MSPs from using customers' assets posted with them as collateral to be used as margin, guarantee, or as a security for any of its trades. 61 As for repos, in the U.S., the amount of a client's assets that can be rehypothecated by a prime broker or a broker dealer is capped to the equivalent of 140% of the client's liability to the prime broker or dealer, 62 but such a cap might not be needed under the UK securities financing transactions as discussed below. Financial collateral arrangements in Europe is mainly governed by the FCD. 64 The main aim of the FCD is to harmonize the regime applicable to financial collateral arrangements. The FCD governs the collateral provided using title transfer or the grant of a security interest. 2. Higher levels of transparency on the practices of investment funds engaged in the SFTs and total return swaps by imposing reporting requirements on those operations.
3. Higher levels of transparency of the reuse of collateral by imposing minimum conditions to be met for reuse, such as written agreement and prior consent.
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Therefore, the SFTR requires prior consent for reuse of collateral, and disclosure of risks and consequences of reuses to the parties posting the collateral. In other words, the SFTR subjects the right to reuse of collateral to the notice and consent requirements. 73 Namely, the receiving counterparty should inform the counterparty providing the collateral in writing of the risks involved in consent to a right of reuses of collateral 74 and in concluding a title transfer collateral arrangement, and the providing counterparty should grant its express consent to reuse.
One of the significant differences in the regulatory treatment of SFTs across the Atlantic is the limit or cap on the rehypothecation of collateral in the U.S. as opposed to, many other markets including the EU markets. At the EU level, there is no cap on the reuse, as opposed to the 140% cap in the U.S. 75 However, individual member states, such as France, have established similar limitations (140% cap). Although in the UK there is no 140% cap on rehypothecation, it seems that the percentage used in the U.S. has created anchoring effect, and in fact many hedge funds are using 140% cap as a benchmark in negotiating prime brokerage agreements with their banks.
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The composition, structure and organization of repo markets Many banks with high levels of expertise therefore appear on both sides of different repo transactions. Therefore, a big interbank repo market, which has access to ECB's liquidity, is at the center of European repo market (See Figure below) .
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In the U.S., at least one party involved in a repo transaction is almost always a securities dealer. 
Maturity
Traditionally, the repo transactions in the U.S. have a shorter maturity than those in Europe.
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The following figure shows that both before and after the GFC, over 90 percent of the notional value of repos are overnight. 82 Krishnamurthy, Nagel, and Orlov, "Sizing up Repo," 29-30. Overnight repos could serve as an alternative funding source of bank deposits. 85 Overnight or shorter-term repo financing means higher maturity transformation if the short-term repos are used to finance long-term loans. This means that the maturity transformation happening through repo transactions in the U.S. is much more excessive than in the EU. Therefore, ceteris paribus, financing by short-term repos can be more prone to runs compared to longer-term repos. Accordingly, in terms of maturity, the U.S. repo markets are more prone to runs and are overall riskier than the EU repo markets. Where the market is dominated by overnight repos, the initial margin or haircut play a more important role in valuing the collateral. With the underlying collateral returned to the investor the next business day, parties would likely assume the likelihood of the fluctuation of the collateral value to be minimal. Moreover, lacking the possibility of a margin call, the collateral delivered should be negotiated to reflect the market value more precisely in the event of a default. This might help explain why an increase of repo haircuts can be observed in the U.S.
during the GFC.
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Difference in the composition of collateral
Another important difference between the U.S. and the EU repo markets concerns the composition of the collateral used in the repo markets. It is estimated that around 80% of the collateral used in the European repo markets is government securities. Structured securities used as collateral in the EU markets are a small component of the overall collateral backing repo transactions, and where they are used, they are often used in tri-party repo markets.
However, tri-party repos amount to 10% of the European repo markets, and the use of structured securities as collateral amount to about 10% of the European tri-party repos.
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Given that one of the reasons for the predominance of the repo transactions is the supply of highly-demanded safe assets, 89 the use of government securities as collateral in the EU repo markets is of special importance for the financial stability, because these securities have 87 Krishnamurthy, Nagel, and Orlov, "Sizing up Repo.", 32. 88 ICMA FAQs. How is it changing?
In Europe, the repo market is now shrinking -its base size was estimated to be €5.4tn in June, down 1.6% on the previous year, according to the International Capital Markets Association. proven to be resilient to runs in the times of crises. As the study by Gorton and Metrick on runs on repos backed by Asset-Backed Commercial Paper (ABCP) shows, during the financial crisis, the major repo runs occurred on the commercial paper (ABCP) used as collateral.
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Other studies show that such a run did not occur on repos backed by government bonds.
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Therefore, in the absence of sovereign default risk, the risk of a run on the European repo markets cannot be deemed significant. As the financial crisis also showed, the EU repo markets weathered the crisis much better than the US markets did, perhaps because of the reliance of the EU markets on repos collateralized by government bonds. collateral shortage. The CCPs will likely need higher margining and contribution from clearing members, they also would set higher haircuts to improve their resilience to possible defaults, 101 resulting in a decrease in overall market efficiency. Moreover, as Duffie and Zhu point out, since introducing a CCP means a loss in bilateral netting opportunities in other classes of derivatives between the parties, the regulator should always consider whether the benefits of multilateral netting could outweigh that loss. 102 In addition, it is important to note that by using CCPs, the liquidity risks will not simply disappear, they are rather shifted and concentrated within the CCPs, the failure of which would be even more devastating to the financial system.
Differences in market infrastructure
To decrease the likelihood of a member's default, CCPs often set certain membership criteria before they accept a financial institution as their clearing member. 103 CCPs also demand variation margins from their members on an intraday basis to maintain an appropriate risk buffer against market volatility. In the event of default by a clearing member, the conservatively calculated initial margin could be used in the close-out process before the default fund of the defaulting member is disposed. The default funds of non-defaulting members come only in play when the CCP's contribution is exhausted. The CCPs often have recovery tools to replenish the default funds, they also have a "default waterfall" for their own protection. For example, in Europe in covering losses, a CCP should use the following default waterfall.
4. Default fund contributions of the non-defaulting clearing members and any other financial resources of the CCP.
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There has been concerns about the waterfall design itself giving the non-defaulting clearing members a false sense of security, as they rely on the CCP and its default funds as a last resort.
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European Market Infrastructure Regulation (EMIR) 106 contains several articles that are crucial to the operation of a CCP in Europe. Article 45 EMIR stipulate that in a default situation, the contributions of non-defaulting party can only be used if both the contributions of defaulting member and the dedicated own resources of the CCP has been exhausted. The margin of a non-defaulting member can never be used to cover the losses incurred from the default of another clearing member. 107 The amount of own resources that the CCP must dedicate is known as 'skin in the game' clause which aligns the interest of clearing members and the CCP shareholders and managers. This amount is set at 25% by the technical standards which shall be revised on an annual basis. More recent studies advocate the expansion of usage of CCPs in the U.S. interdealer market.
Based on an analysis conducted by the Office of Financial Research (OFR), extending U.S.
Treasuries repo CCP services to non-dealers could reduce 81% of risk exposures, which is substantially higher than the risk reduction that would have been achieved by sole bilateral netting (63%).
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Traditionally, CCPs play a significantly more important role in Europe than in the U.S.
Currently, about 70% of European repo market turnover is being cleared through CCPs. on an uncapped and uncommitted basis 115 in response to a tri-party reform effort, the FICC can no longer operate its interbank repo service. We will briefly discuss the tri-party repo reform at the end of next subsection.
Collateral management: tri-party repo agents
A substantial part of the repo transactions in the U.S. is tri-party repos (with overnight maturity), whereas the vast majority of repos in Europe remains bilateral. 116 In June 2014, the outstanding value of tri-party repo represented more than 60% of the overall market. At the same time in Europe, this number was merely 10%. 117 In a bilateral repo, the lender and the borrower will each enter into a clearing agreement with their custodian bank. In a bilateral repo, this custodian bank is also responsible for clearing and settling the securities on behalf of each party.
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In a triparty repo market, a third party (a clearing bank) facilitates the repo settlement, whereas a bilateral repo is directly settled between the two parties to the transactions (collateral and cash provider) without the interposition of a third party. 119 In a tri-party repo, where primarily General Collateral repos (GC Repos) 120 are traded, the parties agree on the cash amount first after which they select an eligible security or a basket of securities as collateral, whereas in a special repo, the parties will stipulate the securities at hand first. Comotto defines tri-party repo as "a repo for which collateral management is delegated by the counterparties to a third In Europe, the repo market is now shrinking -its base size was estimated to be €5.4tn in June, down 1.6 per cent on the previous year, according to the International Capital Markets Association.
https://www.ft.com/content/7b413b0c-960f-11e6-a80e-bcd69f323a8b
There are also additional fundamental differences between the U.S and EU triparty repo markets. See "Frequently Asked Questions on Repo.", question no. 24. 118 Baklanova, Copeland, and McCaughrin, "Reference Guide to Us Repo and Securities Lending Markets," 5. party agent". 121 According to him, it is the participation of this said tri-party agent in this one particular stage in the life of a repo that makes it different from a bilateral repo. A tri-party agent is therefore not a CCP, who is interposed into each repo transaction to become a highquality counterparty to buyers and sellers.
In the U.S. there are only two major clearing banks who offer to settle repo transactions on their own balance sheet, namely the Bank of New York Mellon and JP Morgan Chase. 122 To employ the service of a tri-party agent, the counterparties to the repo will normally enter into a custodian undertaking agreement (CUA) with at least one of these two clearing banks. By entering into such an agreement, the investor also specifies under which rules the accepted collateral should be selected.
The following figure  123 shows that over 80% of the collateral used in tri-party repos are
Fedwire-eligible collateral backed by governmental agencies. 121 Comotto, "A Primer on Tri-Party Repo.", Subtitle 1.
122 Baklanova, Copeland, and McCaughrin, " Reference Guide to Us Repo and Securities Lending Markets," 5. The transition from bilateral into tri-party repo in the U.S. is driven by the urge to alleviate the burden of collateral management on counterparties. 124 To manage a collateral in a bilateral repo, one must regularly revalue the collateral, call agreed margin from or make supplemental delivery to the other party, respond to the occurrence of income payments and corporate actions, and to valid requests for collateral substitution. 125 All of the above activities require a significantly high level of expertise which the lender might not have at its disposal. The first solution to this problem was to develop a 'hold-in-custody' repo model where the collateral remains at the seller side, which created the 'double-dipping' problem. To avoid that problem, the parties agree to let a third party to step in, so the seller cannot sell the same security to different parties without notifying the buyer. A typical tri-party repo transaction in the U.S.
has broker-dealers on the borrower side and risk-averse investors such as money market mutual funds on the lender side.
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The unwind and rewind process
The scale of operation of tri-party agents in Europe is much wider and much more expensive than their counterparts in the U.S. 127 There are also some distinctions as to the concrete activities that a tri-party agent normally conducts in Europe from those conducted by the U.S.
tri-party agents. Instead of offering the possibility to adjust margining, collect income payments and make corresponding manufactured payments to the seller or substitute collateral, 128 the two clearing banks in the U.S. choose to unwind and reallocate the repo on a daily basis. This gives the seller the opportunity to collect any income payments by themselves, revalue the collateral and apply new margining at the latest prices. During this time, the clearing bank provides the borrower with an intraday loan secured by the same security the borrower keeps at the clearing bank. In the meantime, the lender has an unsecured exposure to the clearing bank. In other words, the clearing bank becomes de facto principal to the trade instead of agents. Thus, the clearing banks were providing massive uncommitted loans to dealers without submitting themselves to capital charges.
The process of allocation of securities could take much longer than necessary. The main reason for this phenomenon is the fact that the allocation system used by clearing banks may not be able to meet all the requirements on collateral a cash provider may have. 129 Although the allocation algorithms used by the clearing banks are being improved over time, it is still difficult to automatically distinguish similar securities. In fact, the dealer often chooses to 126 Ibid., subtitle 4 127 Ibid., Subtitle 1 and Subtitle 4. 128 Ibid. Subtitle 1, "What is the function of a tri-party agent". 129 Comotto, "A Primer on Tri-Party Repo," 10.
manually intervene in this process by specifying exactly which types of securities they wish to include in their collateral pool. Moreover, due to technical reasons in the market infrastructure, many securities cannot be completely settled until late in the afternoon, which prolonged the allocation process further.
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To sum up, there was a significant time gap between the daily morning unwind and the completion of allocation process in the traditional U.S. tri-party repo market, which contributes to the fragility of this market. During the crisis, the two clearing banks have served as intraday creditors for as long as 10 hours on a daily basis. 131 Therefore, in case a dealer experiences distress during this period, if the clearing bank discovers that its loan to the dealer is undercollateralized (maybe due to a crisis situation), the bank will have a huge incentive to sell those assets as quickly as possible in order to keep its leverage ratio in check. Those large amount of 'fire sales' could reduce the value of that collateral, creating a vicious cycle. 132 The clearing bank may -in contrast to a common pre-crisis false presumption that it could not 133 -refuse to unwind certain securities due to concerns about the dealer to protect itself, leaving the lender exposed to the borrower holding its collateral. 134 However, this action will certainly have a devastating effect on the dealer, because it will not be able to make delivery of all the securities he uses as collateral. Meanwhile, subject to legal restrictions, some investors might not be legally permitted to hold certain assets on their balance sheets, which forces them to fire-sell the securities, driving the price thereof to the ground.
Due to this flawed design in the key mechanics of the tri-party repo market, at the first sign of distress of a borrower, the collateral acts like a 'hot potato', giving the cash provider a perverse incentive to run on repo with their cash even if the collateral still meets its standards set by the CUA at the moment. In addition, the clearing bank will have an incentive to refuse the 130 Baklanova, Copeland, and McCaughrin, "Reference Guide to Us Repo and Securities Lending Markets," 8.
131 Ibid., [8] [9] [10] Ibid., 7. 133 Ibid., 10.
134 Ibid. unwinding to the same party. The following figure  135 shows a sharp drop on Lehman tri-party repo books even in U.S. Treasuries and assets which are normally deemed safe when the bank went bankrupt.
According to a recent report by the Financial Stability Oversight Council (FSOC), post-crisis reforms should be extended to the GCF Repos. The risk of collateral fire-sales by creditors of the defaulted broker-dealers remains a major financial stability concern. 136 The Federal
Reserve Bank of New York (FRBNY) has an interest in reforming the two clearing banks because they are operating other businesses as financial intermediaries and are subject to prudential regulation. 137 Their exposure from clearing activity could therefore affect their banking business as well. It is also the responsibility of the Federal Reserve to supervise and regulate the banking industry in the U.S., to ensure its safety and soundness, and act as the lender of last resort to banks. In addition, the clearing banks and some dealers in this market are systemically important. The dilemma before the regulators could be a classical one: the failure of a clearing bank could be unacceptable and catastrophic to the financial system, whereas bailing it out using the taxpayers' money could lead to moral hazard. Regulatory reforms affecting securities financing transactions -especially the collateral used in such transactions -spans across a whole host of regulations having direct or indirect impact on repos. We have discussed some of the recent regulatory developments so far. In the next section, we will discuss some other major regulatory developments indirectly impacting repo markets.
Basel III and the new developments in the regulation of repo markets
The repo market is being increasingly regulated since the GFC. Investors have become more prudent in lending against highly rated assets without government backing, giving rise to a higher demand in the quality of collateral and a higher overall cost of credit. 143 Recently, the European repo market has come under stress in terms of collateral shortage. The European Central Bank's (ECB) asset purchase program (APP) created liquidity, but also drove down lending rates, both for secured and unsecured lending. 144 Rather counterintuitively, instead of the SFTR and FCD regimes, Basel III and its implementation in the EU by the Capital Requirements Directive (CRD IV) 145 and the Capital requirements, and the introduction of leverage ratio, liquidity coverage ratio (LCR) and net stable funding ratio (NSFR) all have a potential impact on repo markets in terms of increased cost of capital and liquidity for engaging in repo transactions.
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The impact is more dramatic in case of leverage ratio and LCR. 148 As for the leverage ratio, Basel III proposes a non-risk-weighted leverage ratio set at 3% of tier 1 capital to total assets plus off-balance sheet exposures. The majority of repos are considered as a financial instrument with low risk and low return, because, traditionally, governmental bonds have a zero-risk weight. Implementing a non-risk-weighted leverage ratio means the same unit of reverse-repo bears the same amount of regulatory cost as unsecured loans, therefore it is much more expensive. In addition, a differentiation based on the quality of underlying collateral will not be directly considered under the new leverage ratio. Ibid. dealers in certain asset classes entering triparty repo markets, suggesting a risk shifting behavior from the banking sector to non-bank sector. 153 This increase in the importance of nonbank-affiliated broker-dealers in tri-party repo markets has been due to the more stringent capital requirements imposed on BHCs at a consolidated level.
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The LCR requirement, which will be fully implemented by 2019, stipulates that the bank should hold more high-quality liquid assets. Banks are therefore encouraged to switch to these assets at least at the end of each reporting period. The LCR of the Basel III makes it costlier for BHCs and their subsidiaries to rely on short-term repo funding with low-quality collateral.
Basel III's NSFR is also adopted to encourage banks and their subsidiaries to rely more on the longer-term liabilities (with a maturity of over a year) and reduce their reliance on short-term wholesale funding.
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In 2011, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) expanded the deposit insurance assessment base from deposit to all of bank liabilities (including repos). This is expected to make it more expensive for insured banks to fund their assets in the repo markets. 156 Section 165 and 166 of the Dodd-Frank Act (enhancing prudential standards for U.S. BHCs) also encourages the dealer subsidiaries of BHCs to shift more toward longer-term financing.
Although the size of repo markets remains substantial, overall the maturity of repo funding has been extended, especially for the repos with low-quality collateral. 157 There has also been a move toward diversification of funding sources among dealers. 158 Although U.S. dealers and banks have decreased their reliance on repo, for U.S.-based foreign bank offices, repo remains a substantial source of funding. This is mainly because of differences in regulations as well as the fact that those banks have a limited access to U.S. retail deposits.
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The reforms of the market infrastructure for repo and derivatives transactions will also affect the repo markets. This is expected to strengthen the risk management by tri-party repo cash investors by incenting them to accept more liquid and high-quality collateral, hence decreasing the counterparty risk. A trend towards more conservatively collateralized tri-party repo markets is expected which could lead to more conservative pricing of credit intermediation by tri-party repo markets. 160 In sum, it seems that the implementation of Basel III will have an adverse effect on the incentives of banks to provide or receive funding through repo markets, thereby undermining the demand for short-term repo funding.
Conclusion
In spite of international efforts both by industry associations and international financial regulatory fora to harmonize and standardize the practices in repo markets, this paper uncovered significant divergences, differences and idiosyncrasies in the existing repo markets across the Atlantic. These differences span across a wide variety of issues, including legal underpinnings and structure of repo markets, repo terms, repo participants, the underlying collateral backing repos, and idiosyncrasies in the financial market infrastructure within which repos are being cleared and settled. Although the GFC provided a clear evidence that financial markets have converged and become homogenous, and virtually no issue could be dealt with separately, this should not lead international financial fora and national regulators to overlook such idiosyncrasies in their quest to promote financial stability. At the very least, the cognizance of such differences requires differentiated approaches to regulating repo markets.
Although the post-GFC regulatory reforms including the Dodd-Frank Act, the EMIR Regulation and a plethora of different legislative and regulatory measures, such as SFTR and BRRD in Europe, share the same objectives, which includes avoiding fire-sales, mitigating systemic risk, improving market transparency and ensuring the smooth operation of financial markets, the means to achieve those ends differ in significant ways across the Atlantic. Our findings suggest that even taking account of the post-GFC regulatory reforms in the EU and the U.S., the regulatory divergences in the repo markets persist, as manifested, for example, in the treatment of repos in the insolvency proceedings. The paper recounts a cautionary tale of the divergences, idiosyncrasies and differences in the global financial markets, which rally against the efforts to apply uniform rules and regulations at the international level to the markets replete with such salient idiosyncrasies and argues that such distinctions should not be swept under the rug by international fora having the mandate of promoting global financial stability.
